Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy
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This volume explores the relationship between Kant's aesthetic theory and his critical epistemology as articulated in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The essays, written specially for this volume, explore core elements of Kant's epistemology, such as his notions of discursive understanding, experience, and objective judgment. They also demonstrate a rich grasp of Kant's critical epistemology that enables a deeper understanding of his aesthetics. Collectively, the essays reveal that Kant's critical project, and the dialectics of aesthetics and cognition within it, is still relevant to contemporary debates in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and the nature of experience and objectivity. The book also yields important lessons about the ineliminable, yet problematic place of imagination, sensibility and aesthetic experience in perception and cognition.
“fights” his own evolving picture of the aesthetic at every step, “refuting or denigrating” his own main conclusions and “abruptly terminating” discussions that would fill out and clarify this picture. And indeed, it does seem that despite Kant’s architectonic ambitions and his clear desire for a systematic unity of the three Critiques, he is remarkably reticent about directly discussing the substantive connections between empirical and aesthetic judgment or the role of figurative synthesis in
independently as an answer to the question of how empirical schemata are applied; moreover, even if we could make sense of synthesis according to the categories alone, it would not be sufficient to account for the acquisition of empirical schemata. Longuenesse also takes the “concepts of reflection” discussed in the Amphiboly to play a role in empirical concept formation (122ff.), but for reasons similar to those just mentioned, I do not think that they help to address the problem with which we
can legitimately take it as representing a standard that all human beings, myself included, ought to meet. And if that is so, then to the extent that my dispositions to associate representations are independent of my desires and of other contingent features of my psychology, I can take them as exemplifying normative rules that apply to all human beings.25 25 This talk of “entitlement” may suggest a further, and still more general, worry about the view I am ascribing to Kant. Suppose that I am
imaginative synthesis than we do on the outcome of peering out the window. And recall that schematization, also allied with understanding, “is a hidden art within the depths of the human soul” (A141/B180–1). It is also surely the case that some judgments are as much compulsory, and as little a matter of self-conscious deliberation or decision, as are perceptions. Perception saddles us not just with experience, but also with beliefs. And some inferences are inescapable; the force of an argument
contemplation of a graphic design (but perhaps not a musical composition) might be – and that we would then like to prolong. 6. But the deeper philosophical problem for both precognitive and multicognitive approaches to the harmony of the faculties is that the very idea of a state of our cognitive powers that does not involve any determinate concepts is dubious. In fact, this idea is inconsistent both with an ordinary assumption about judgments of taste and with the most fundamental claims of