Lenin and His Comrades: The Bolsheviks Take Over Russia 1917-1924
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What was the real impact and significance of the October Revolution of 1917? This avowedly revisionist interpretation by a major Russian dissident seeks to place Lenin and those around him in the proper perspective. Since the takeover of Russia was the result of a coup d’état by a tiny minority of criminals that Yuri Felshtinsky doesn’t hesitate to call gangsters, the Communist regime was doomed from the start.
Yuri Felshtinsky received a PhD in history from Rutgers University. His books include The Failure of the World Revolution (1991), Blowing up Russia (with Alexander Litvinenko, 2007), and The Corporation: Russia and the KGB in the Age of President Putin (with Vladimir Pribylovsky, 2008). He lives near Boston, Massachusetts.
time noted that he seemed pale, aged, and had somewhat toned down the previous brazenness of his speeches. This was particularly apparent during the autumn months of 1954. At the end of October or the beginning of November, he was summoned back to Moscow “to deliver a report and to receive new instructions.” As the general prosecutor, Vyshinsky himself had more than once sent such “summonses” to Moscow to Soviet diplomats who would be arrested upon arrival and he understood perfectly well why he
Brestskii mir. M., Nauka, 1964, pp. 140–141. 13. M. Maiorov. Borba Sovetskoi Rossii, p. 211; A. Chubaryan. Brestskii mir, p. 141. 14. M. Maiorov. Bor’ba Sovetskoi Rossii, p. 211. 15. V. Lenin. The Complete Collected Works, 5th ed., vol. 35, p. 332. 16. Trotsky’s archive, T-3742; O. Chernin. Brest-Litovsk —Grani, No 153, 1989, p. 173. 17. General Hoffmann. Voina upuchshennyh vozmozhnostei. GIZ, Moscow-Leningrad., 1925, p. 186; Trotsky’s archive, T-3742. P. Frelih. K istorii
endless petty fights against his real and imagined enemies, which perpetually preoccupied Lenin, without any shady “German money,” without compromising himself by passing through German enemy territory, Trotsky became the number two man in the government with an ease that others might have envied. It was precisely this arrogant gesture—and his emphatic indifference to personal power, the ease with which everything came to him, and the popularity that he enjoyed among Communist activists—that was
in a state of war or peace,” and which was ruled by a government that was recognized “only by its enemies.” “As the story of the Brest-Litovsk treaty has shown,” the speaker observed, “the key point is not the signing of the agreement, but the guarantee that it will be executed.” And obviously, “no new paper agreements with Germany, no improvements on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,” will restrain Germany “from its future encroachments.” After all, Ukraine, Belorussia, the Caucasus, the Crimea, and
convinced that everything in Theodor Liebknecht’s stories is wrong. He was undoubtedly an honest man, knew a great deal, was entirely correct with regard to Karl Moor, uncovered a lot about his brother’s murder, with some good sources. That Radek had ties to highly placed people in German intelligence, I have no doubt whatsoever (Stalin did not shoot him in 1937 undoubtedly because he was planning on using those old connections), and therefore we may still discover much that is unexpected in this