Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China's Extraordinary Rise

Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China's Extraordinary Rise

Carl E. Walter

Language: English

Pages: 256

ISBN: 0470825863

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

The truth behind the rise of China and whether or not it will be able to maintain it

How did China transform itself so quickly? In Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China's Extraordinary Rise, Revised Edition Carl Walter and Fraser Howie go deep inside the Chinese financial machine to illuminate the social and political consequences of the unique business model that propelled China to economic powerhouse status, and question whether this rapid ascension really lives up to its reputation.

All eyes are on China, but will it really surpass the U.S. as the world's premier global economy? Walter and Howie aren't so certain, and in this revised and updated edition of Red Capitalism they examine whether or not the 21st century really will belong to China.

  • The specter of a powerful China is haunting the U.S. and other countries suffering from economic decline and this book explores China's next move
  • Packed with new statistics and stories based on recent developments, this new edition updates the outlook on China's future with the most cutting-edge information available
  • Find out how China financed its current position of strength and whether it will be able to maintain its astonishing momentum

Indispensable reading for anyone looking to understand the limits that China's past development decisions have imposed on its brilliant future, Red Capitalism is an essential resource for anyone considering China's business strategies in today's extremely challenging global economy.

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banks. With the apparently successful rehabilitation of BOC and CCB, the Party was, in effect, telling the banks that they now had to share the burden. From this came the lending binge of 2009; the banks had once again reverted to their role as a simple utility. THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE RESTRUCTURING MODEL The MOF, of course, was unhappy with its subordination to the PBOC following the restructuring of the banks up to 2004. Historically, this was almost the first time that their roles had

for Chen Yuan’s ambitions for the CDB and represents a major victory for the MOF, which in all probability encouraged his listing ambitions. As discussed below, when China Investment Corporation (CIC) acquired Central Huijin in 2007, it acquired a full 100 percent interest in the CDB. The tables were now turned on Chen Yuan. In the greatest of political ironies, the CDB has now returned to its roots—as a mere sub-department of the MOF—but at what cost to the system? The People’s Bank of China

root cause of the market’s failure to develop was found in the command-economy mentality of the “early days of the transition when the economy was more planned than market-driven.” This comment, historically couched as it was, pointed straight at the NDRC, but the fact is that previous central bank administrations had also done little to promote the bond markets, leaving them to the MOF. With the support of the Party’s “Nine Articles,” which explicitly called for the development of bond

(US$1.14 trillion) in outstanding local-government bank debt. If this widely reported figure is accurate, then local governments and their agencies have borrowed the equivalent of 23 percent of the country’s annual GDP. Analysts at China International Capital Corporation (CICC) put current debt levels at RMB7.2 trillion (US$1.1 trillion), peaking at RMB9.8 trillion (US$1.4 trillion) in 2011. But the report provides an even greater service when it states: “If the financing chain for the

call from a recently listed company asking for advice on how to set up an equity trading desk now that management had some cash in hand. Given the ability to achieve a return greater than the bank deposit rate and the ease with which trading can be disguised, why wouldn’t a corporate treasurer look to make some easy money while the market is running hot? Based though it is on sparse public information, Table 7.8 provides a rough breakdown by types of investors in Chinese A-shares at the end of

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