Wittgenstein: A Guide for the Perplexed (Guides for the Perplexed)
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Continuum's Guides for the Perplexed are clear, concise and accessible introductions to thinkers, writers and subjects that students and readers can find especially challenging. Concentrating specifically on what it is that makes the subject difficult to fathom, these books explain and explore key themes and ideas, guiding the reader towards a thorough understanding of demanding material. Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the most influential twentieth century philosophers with his ideas occupying a central place in the history and study of modern philosophy. Students will inevitably encounter his major contributions to the philosophies of language, mind, logic and mathematics. However, there is no escaping the extent of the challenge posed by Wittgenstein whose complex ideas are often enigmatically expressed.
Wittgenstein: A Guide for the Perplexed is an authoritative, comprehensive and lucid commentary on the philosophy of this eminent modern thinker. It offers sound guidance to reading Wittgenstein and a valuable methodology for interpreting his works. The illuminating text covers the entirety of Wittgenstein's thought, examining the relationship between the early, middle and late periods of his philosophy. Detailed attention is paid to Wittgenstein's great works the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, as well as to other published writings. Valuably, the guide also covers ground not commonly explored in studies of Wittgenstein, including his contributions to aesthetics and philosophy of religion. This is the most thorough and fully engaged account of Wittgenstein available - an invaluable resource for students and anyone interested in philosophy and modern intellectual history.
this problem has implications for the treatment of logical necessity in the Tractatus. Formal logic can have quite different philosophical interpretations, such as in the treatment of quantifiers. Wittgenstein took formal logic from Frege and Russell but offered differing philosophical interpretations of certain aspects of it. Logic provided the structure of what could be said. He inherited the idea from Frege and Russell that propositions are composed of function and argument (3.318 and 5.47).
conception of logical analysis presupposed in the Tractatus. He regarded the fundamental intellectual error of the book as being that of dogmatism (WWK. pp. 182^4). In the Tractatus the task of logical analysis had been to uncover logical form hidden by natural language. Wittgenstein 59 WITTGENSTEIN: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED offered a perspective on his previous conception of logical analysis (PG,p.211): Formerly, I myself spoke of a 'complete analysis', and I used to believe that philosophy
general about the detailed content of a particular grammatical investigation as each inquiry is shaped by the problem it is directed at. For example, the grammatical rules for arithmetic which are of philosophical interest are a philosopher's reasons for judging whether or not certain arithmetical calculations are correct. There is no such thing as delineating the grammatical rules for arithmetic which a philosopher attends to because of the relativity of interest of the grammatical rules to the
requires a norm of correctness in practice. A significant distinction for Wittgenstein is that between being in accord with and following a rule. To follow a rule an individual must intend to follow it and be able to invoke it in account of his practice if required. For instance, a rule might be cited as an explanation for particular actions. The cases of rule-following which have been considered here are straightforward but there have been substantial attempts (notably in jurisprudence) to
language. He claimed that a linguistic community must agree in definitions and judgements. Agreement in definitions is accord over the rules of use for words. Agreement in judgements is accord over what counts as the correct applications of a rule. Wittgenstein thought that agreement in judgements (or at minimum in a core of judgements) is a requirement for having agreement in definitions (PI, §242). The form of life and the general facts of nature are parts of the framework within which language